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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
EAST COAST DISCOUNT CORPORATION, 
a Corporation, Respondent, 
vs. 
BRYCE REYNOLDS and DARWIN NEU-
ENSCHWANDER, d/b/a REYNOLDS 
SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, a co-
partnership and BRYCE REYNOLDS and 
DARWIN NEUENSCHWANDER, lndi-
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 8693 
On September 22nd, 1952, the Appellants signed a written 
contract with the Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc. by its 
representative, N. Newman, (Tr. 52) whereby the Appellants 
were granted the exclusive right to sell the products of the said 
Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc. in the Town of Sandy and 
Trading Area. The merchandise ordered in the contract was 
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shipped to the defendants but not paid for by them at the time. 
At a later date another representative of the Carbozite Pro-
tective Coatings Inc., came to defendants and advised them 
they had to have additional merchandise in order to proceed 
with their sales and make their demonstrations. At that time 
six trade acceptances were presented to the defendants which 
were signed by the defendants and the merchandise accordingly 
shipped to them by the Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., 
but the trade acceptances were not paid by defendants. In view 
of this case being decided at the pre-trial of the case, there was 
no testimony given for reasons of not paying the trade accept-
ances, but the facts are, that the defendants had a defense for 
non payment of these trade acceptances, as outlined in their 
answer to the complaint of the plaintiff (Tr. 10). 
That before maturity, as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, 
these trade acceptances were negotiated by the Carbozite Pro-
tective Coatings to the plaintiff herein, ( T r. 8-9), and suit 
was instituted by the plaintiff as assignor or purchasers of 
these trade acceptances, against the defendants and the case 
being at issue was called for pretrial. 
At the pre-trial, the contract between the Carbozite Pro-
tective Coatings Inc. and the defendants was introduced in 
evidence (Exhibit 1, Tr .52). An informal discussion was had 
between the court and the respective attorneys for the parties 
to the action. In view of the fact that the suit was instituted by 
the Assignee of the Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., as 
holders in due course, the defense of defendants to the original 
contract between themselves and the Carbozite Protective 
Coatings Inc. would be excluded under rules of evidence, 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
therefore the defendants had to rely upon the defense that the 
Carbozite Protective Coatings was a foreign corporation do-
ing business in the State of Utah, without complying with 
the provisions of Chapter 8, paragraphs 16-8-1-2-3-Utah Code 
Annotated 195 3. 
The court considered the contract and asked defendant's 
.:.ttorney if that was the only defense, or if other evidence 
could be introduced to show that the Carbozite Proective 
Coatings Inc., was doing business in the State of Utah without 
complying with the provisions of the Code. The reply was 
by the defendant's attorney that one other such contract could 
be introduced as evidence that said Carbozite Protective Coat-
ings Inc., was dealing with another party and that was all of 
the evidence the defendants could produce at that time. The 
provisions of the contract was dismissed by the court and the 
attorneys for the respective parties, and the matter was taken 
under advisement and continued to a further date for further 
consideration thereof. At the next hearing on the pre-trial, 
the court after considering the matter, entertained a motion 
for judgment on the part of the plaintiff and the judgment 
was accordingly entered in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendants on the 2nd day of January, 1957 (Tr. 41-
42-53). No findings or conclusions of law apparently were 
filed. 
Within the time allowed by law, and on or about the 
lt1h day of January, 1957 the defendants filed a motion for 
a new trial supported by affidavits. The motion was based 
upon the statutory grounds of newly discovered evidence that 
could not have been reasonably produced at the hearing of 
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the pre-trial, setting forth the facts that the defendants by 
mere chance had discovered a continuation of business activities 
of the Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., in the State of Utah. 
Additional affidavit of the defendants certified that defendants 
had by chance discovered some twenty-two additional parties 
that the said Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc. had done 
business with under identical or similar circumstances they 
had done business with the defendants, which evidence could 
not have been produced as evidence at the original hearing 
or pre-trial, as disclosed by said affidavits of the defendants 
jn support of its motion and its amended motion for a new 
trial (Tr. 44-45-46-47-48-49). The court took the motion under 
advisement and permitted defendants to file a brief thereon. 
After the brief was filed and consideration given thereto the 
court denied the motion for a new trial and defendants now 
appeal to this court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION 
OF THE PLAINTIFF FOR JUDGMENT AT THE PRE-
TRIAL OF SAID CAUSE, IN fAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF 
AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION 
OF THE DEFENDANTS FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED 
UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WHICH 
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COULD NOT REASONABLY BE PRODUCED BY THE 




THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION 
OF THE PLAINTIFF FOR JUDGMENT AT THE PRE-
TRIAL OF SAID CAUSE, IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF 
AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS. 
The judgment in this case in favor of the plaintiff and 
:1gainst the defendants apparently was decided by the court 
solely upon the theory that the plaintiff's assignor, the Carbo-
zite Protective Coatings Inc. was soliciting business and selling 
merchandise in interstate transactions. At least that is the only 
conclusion that can be drawn by reason of lack of findings 
of fact and conclusions of law lacking in this matter and the 
further failure of the court to enter a pre-trial order setting 
forth its reasonings or conclusions upon which judgment was 
entered herein. 
The court apparently overlooked the provisions of the con-
tract entered into by and between the defendants and the plain-
tiff's assignor, Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., by failing 
to take into consideration the provisions of said contract with 
respect to what said corporation was to do in assisting the 
defendants to market its products, among which were certain 
§ circulations of its advertisements; advertising in local papers, 
J( sending a representative of said company to assist the defend-
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<!.nts in making contact with prospective customers and instruct-
mg the defendants in the application and sale of said products. 
The contract was signed and accepted in behalf of said cor-
poration by its authorized agent and the contract was con-
summated and closed in the State of Utah without having to 
be approved by any other representative of said company. 
The trade acceptances upon which this suit is based, having 
been assigned to the plaintiff herein, before the due date, and 
the plaintiff being a holder in due course, it is presumably 
the law that any defeense the defendants may have to a breach 
of the contract entered into by the plaintiff's assignor and the 
defendants would be, according to the rules of evidence, cut 
off. This resolves the matter down to whether the Carbozite 
Protective Coatings Inc., was doing business as a foreign cor-
poration in the State of Utah, without having complied with 
the laws of the State of Utah, as provided by Sections 8-1-2-3 
U.C.A. 1953. If they were doing business as defined by that 
statute and the court so determined they were doing business, 
then such a contract is void as to all subsequent holders, in 
due course or otherwise. We will therefore confine this point 
of our argument to that question. 
The defendants are well aware of the fact that this court 
has decided that isolated transactions by such a corporation 
in the State of Utah is not doing business within the contem-
plation of the statute, or that interstate transactions by such 
a corporation is doing doing business, but this court and other 
courts have likewise decided that a continuation of such trans· 
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We respectively submit to the court the provisions of the 
contract between the Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., and 
the defendants as follows: 
"POWER OF ATTORNEY: The Dealer is hereby 
given Power of Attorney to replace any material neces-
sary to his customers, in accordance with the terms of 
the Guaranty and the Company will replace to him free 
of charge replacements made by the Dealer." 
While this power of attorney is limited, it nevertheless 
authorized and directs the dealer to act for and in behalf of 
the Corportaion and to perform in behalf of the Corporation 
local acts in furtherance of its business. 
"ADVERTISING: The Dealer will submit a list up 
to 200 names of commercial, home or farm property 
owners in his territory, on the Company's form, which 
will be circularized in his behalf by the company at 
their expense, enclosing therein a return request for 
samples, addressed to the Dealer." 
The Company will circularize these forms in behalf of the 
dealer by the Company at their expense. Another local actiyity 
on the part of the Company constituting doing business in the 
state pursuant to decisions of the court hereinafter referred to. 
If a corporation cannot do these local acts by reason of the 
prohibition of the statute directly, they cannot do this in-
directly by merely constituting, or naming its agent as a dealer. 
"NEWSPAPER ADVERTISING: The Company 
will share with the Dealer fifty-fifty in the cost of news-
paper advertising. Mats for this purpose will be sup-
plied by the Company, gratis, upon request." 
Another local act to be performed by the company through 
its agents, called the dealer. Even supplying the advertising. 
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"SALES COOPERATION: Upon the written request 
of the Dealer and at a date mutually agreed upon, or 
at an earlier date if the Company can arra~ge it, the 
Company will send a representative at theu e~pense 
to make calls with the Dealer or his representative on 
any prospects he may have at the time of such visit." 
As additional act of a local nature, sending its own agents 
into the State to make such sales, by using the Dealer as a 
subterfuge. This is all in furtherance of selling its products 
in the state. The mere fact that the Company attempts to use 
the dealer in this manner does not do away with the fact 
that the company is actually making its sales in the state, with-
out being subject to taxation, licenses and other regulations 
of the law pertaining to doing business in the state, in com-
petition with local corporations who are subject to such 
regulations. 
The foregoing provision of this contract is going beyond 
the decisions of the courts, wherein the courts have held that 
certain sales are in interstate commerce and in support of this 
let us consider the following authorities: 
McGriff v. Charles Antell, Inc., 256 P.2nd 703, Utah. 
"In determining whether a foreign corporation is 
doing business in a State for jurisdictional purposes, 
each case factually must be examined as it arises. A 
hard and fast formula cannot determine every case. 
Common sense must dictate the result." 
Normandie Oil Corp. v. Oil Trading Co., 163 S.\\r. 2nd 179. 
"And where a non-resident corporation performs 
an act of local nature even when that act is part of 
a contract for the sale of goods in interstate commerce, 
10 
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the act is intrastate, and is subject to regulation by the 
State. 246 U. S. 500, 142 S. W. 1157." 
Merchant v. National Reserve Co. of America, 137 Pac. 2nd 
332, Utah. 
"The constitution applies to all Corporations. In our 
opinion the constitution reasonably contstrued, was in-
tended to prohibit corporations from transacting their 
ordinary corporate business within the state without 
first complying with its terms-and was not intended 
or designed to prohibit the doing of one single act of 
business by such foreign corporation with no apparent 
intention to do any other act, or to engage in corporate 
business. 
The general conclusions of the courts is that isolated 
transactions, commercial or otherwise, taking place be-
tween a foreign corporation domiciled in one state and 
citizens of another state, are not a doing or carrying on 
of business by the foreign corporation within the latter 
state, but that these prohibitions are leveled against 
the act of foreign corporations entering the domestic 
state by their agents, and engaging in the general prose-
cution of their ordinary business therein. 
In Booth & Co. v. Weigand, 83 Pac. 734 (Utah) 
discussing the above statutory and constitutional pro-
visions, the court said: "The words doing business, as 
used in these provisions, refer to a general transaction 
of business, and not to an isolated transaction, or to 
a single or wholly collateral acts. The statute obviously 
relates to some regular or customary business." Citing 
certain cases therein the court further says: "The ques-
tion now presented is, What is meant by transacting 
business? The best definition we can think of for this 
phrase is the doing or performing a series of acts 
which occupy the time, attention, and labor of men for 
the purpose of livelihood, profit, or pleasure. It is well 
11 
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established upon authority that doing of a si~gle a_ct 
pertaining to a particular business or tr~nsactwn ':111 
not be considered carrying on, transactmg or domg 
business. The mere term itself implies more than one 
transaction.'' 
"If in fact the corporation is here, if it is here, not 
occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of per-
manence and continuity, then, whether its business is 
interstate or local, is within the jurisdiction of our 
courts . . . But there is no precise test of the nature 
or extent of the business that must be done. All that 
is required is that enough be done to say that the cor-
poration is here. As was said in International Har-
vester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, each case must 
depend upon its own facts." 
It is thus apparent that it is not any activity of a cor-
poration in a state other than its residence which will 
justify the conclusion that it is doing business there 
. . . but it is the combination of local activities con-
ducted by such foreign corporation, their manner, ex-
tent and character, which becomes determinative of the 
jurisdiction question. 
Isolated transactions do not constitute a doing busi-
ness within the meaning of the statute; it contemplates 
a more or less continuing course of business. 
Normandie Oil Corp. v. Oil Trading Co., 163 S.W. 2nd 179 
(Texas). 
"When a non-resident corporation performs an act 
of a local nature even when that act is part of a con-
tract for the sale of goods in interstate commerce, the 
act is intrastate, and is subject to regulation by the 
State. 246 U.S. 500, 142 S. W. 1157. 
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Foreign corporation sends agents into Minn. to 
solicit business and make contracts. A dispute arose 
out of a failure to fulfill the contract and a resident 
filed action serving one of these salesmen. The defend-
ant corporation contends it is not doing business in 
the state and the service on the salesman not binding 
on the corporation, the court said: 
"From the correspondence between the parties it 
clearly appears that these traveling agents had author-
ity to make tentative contracts in this state, defendant 
only reserving the right to pass on the sufficiency of 
the estimate of price for work made by the agent. From 
the receipts given and the contract made by the agent 
in this instance apparently ratified by the manager, 
the agent seemed to have full authority to close the 
contract. The transaction with plaintiff cannot be re-
garded as the only business done by the defendant in 
this state. 
We must infer that such transactions were numerous 
from the fact that these traveling salesmen must have 
subsisted on the commission earned, there being no 
suggestions that they had any other means of support. 
We do not, however, apprehend that the volume of 
business is at all material, nor in what manner it is 
done, nor how those who transact the same for de-
fendant were compensated. The fact remains defendant 
was doing business when it sent its traveling salesman 
into this state and when, in August 1915, plaintiff at 
Farmont made her contract, with one of them and de-
livered to him her coat. It apparently was pursuing the 
same business when on September 1916, it sent another 
of its traveling salesmen to her residence with the 
garment to adjust the claimed liability upon this con-
tract. Penn Lumbermens Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyers, 
197 U. S. 407. A fire insurance company which issues 
policies upon real estate, and personal property situated 
in another state is as much engaged in its business when 
13 
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agents are there under authority adjusting ~he los~es, 
covered by its policies as it is when engaged 1n makmg 
contracts to take such risks." 
Irons v. Simeon L. & George H. Rogers, 166 Fed. 781. 
··I do not understand that the N. Y. representative 
merely transacts offers to buy goods to the Connecticut 
Factory where the defendant decides whether it will 
accept or reject them, but that such representative makes 
binding contracts with purchasers, and sends to Con-
necticut merely directions where to ship the goods. 
If this be so, the case is similar to Cone v. Tuscaloose 
Mfg. Co., 76 Fed. 891, and the motion is denied. If 
the defendant believes it can show that the agent is 
merely soliciting who has no power to contract, and 
will pay the expense of the hearing before a master 
to establish that fact, an order of reference will be 
made." 
Priggs v. Selz Schwab & Co., 138 N.W. 975. 
"Defendant is an Illinois Corporation which manu-
factures shoes and sells them to retail dealers. It also 
arranges for the operation in various localities of what 
are known as Sels Royal Blue Stores. When an arrange-
ment is made to operate one of these stores, defendant 
enters into a contract with the dealer which provides 
that the store shall be known and advertised as the 
dealer's Sels Royal Blue Shoes, etc. . . . We think 
defendant was doing business in this state and that 
such service was valid under the rule established in 
the following and similar cases: 151 N. W. 917; 152 
N. W. 410; 234 U.S. 579. 
International Harvester Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
234 Fed. 579. 
"W~en a corporation of one state goes into an-
other, m order to be regarded as within the latter it 
14 
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must be there by its agents authorized to transact busi-
ness in that state ... each case must depend upon 
its own facts, and there consideration must show that 
this essential requirement of jurisdiction has been com-
plied with, and that the corporation is actually doing 
business within the state. Here was a continuous course 
of business in the solicitation of orders which were sent 
to another state, and in response to which the ma-
chines of the International Harvester were delivered 
within the state of Kentucky. This was a course of 
business, not a single transaction. The agents not only 
solicited such orders in Kentucky, but might there 
receive payment in money, checks, or drafts. They might 
take notes of customers which notes were made payable, 
and doubtless were collected at any bank in Kentucky. 
This course of conduct of authorized agents within the 
state in our judgment constituted a doing of business 
where in such wise that the Harvester Co. might be 
fairly said to have been there doing business and 
amenable to process of the courts of that State." 
I respectfully submit to the court that the foregoing case, 
pertaining to the facts, is identical with the case now before the 
court, but the case now before the court is of a stronger nature. 
The Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., not only took notes 
of its customers, commonly called "trade acceptances" payable 
at any bank in Utah on which it was sent through, but the 
company agreed by its contract to do acts of a local nature as 
outlined by the contract and heretofore set forth hereinabove. 
Actinoo Laboratories, Inc., v. Lamb, 278 N.W. 234 (Iowa). 
"The order for the sale of the machine in question 
expressly provides that it was not subject to counter-
mand or recission. The order contained no limitation 
that it was subject to acceptance. The order contained 
no limitation that it was subject to acceptance or ap-
15 
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proval by the Company in Chicago, nor was any t~sti­
mony offered tending to show any such understanding. 
On the contrary, all of the evidence points to but one 
conclusion and that is that the contract of sale was 
execuetd a~d accepted by the president of t?e plaintiff 
company and machine delivered in the Ctty of Des 
Moines, Iowa, by Dr. Loeb. The evidence shows that 
plaintiff was doing business in the State of Iowa and 
the facts in this case bring it squarely within the pro-
hibition of our statute." 
Imperial Curtain Co. v. Jacobs, 127 N.W. 772 (Michigan). 
"Held that where plaintiff, a foreign corporation not 
having complied with the laws of Michigan, procured 
an advertising contract through traveling salesman 
from defendants, to be performed in Michigan by the 
insertion of defendant's advertisement on a drop cur-
tain in a theatre, the plaintiff in performance of the 
contract, prepared an advertisement in Philadelphia 
and shipped it to Detroit where it was placed on a cur-
tain, such contract related to business of a purely local 
nature not amounting to interstate commerce, and was 
therefore unenforceable.'' 
LaPorte Heinekamp Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 24 Fed. 2d 
861. 
"That which the agent of the defendant did in Mary-
land was soliciting of business, and something more. 
It is well settled that solicitation alone is insufficient 
to constitute doing business in a technical sense. Green 
V. C. B. & 0. Ry., 205 U. S. 530. On the other hand it 
has been held that where there is a continuous course 
of business in solicitation of orders by a foreign cor-
poration, which were sent to another state, and in re-
sponse to which goods of hte corporation were de-
livered within the state, and the agent not only so-
licited orders in money, checks, or drafts and took the 
notes of customers, payable and collectible at banks 
16 
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within the State, there was a doing business which 
would subject the corporation to suit within the State. 
234. U. S. 579, 3 Fed. 2d 520. 
Colorado Iron Works v. Eierra Grand Mining Co., 25 Pac. 325. 
"On the contrary I think justice requires that they 
shall be subject to the action of the courts of the state 
whose comity they thus invoke. For the purpose of be-
ing sued, they ought in such cases to be regarded as 
voluntarily placing themselves in the situation of citi-
zens of that state. Any nautral person who goes into 
another state carries along with him all his personal 
liability; and there is quite as much reason that a cor-
poration which chooses to open an office and transact 
its busines, or to authorize contracts to be made in an-
other state, should be regarded as thereby voluntarily 
submitting itself to the action of the laws of that state, 
as well in reference to the mode of commencing suits 
against it as to the interpretation of the contracts so 
made. 
It must be regarded as the settled law of this state 
that, if a corporation makes a contract in a state other 
than that in which it was chartered, it thereby submits 
itself to the jurisdiction of such foreign sovereignty so 
far as to be liable therein in regard to that contract 
when summoned according to the laws of the state. 
(Citing other cases) where the same general principles 
are recognized and asserted; and the same may be said 
of the courts of the states and that in England the same 
jurisdiction is asserted over foreign corporations." 
John Deere Plow Co. v. My land et al., 76 Pac. 863 (Kansas) 
(Suit on a promissory note for merchandise pur-
chased.) "Although the record in each case discloses but 
one transaction of the corporation that transaction wa~ 
1
1· not merely incidental or casual. It was part of th~:: 
~ very business to perform which the corporation existed 
17 
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It did distinctly indicate a purpose on the part of the 
corporation to engage in business within the. State, and 
to make Kansas a part of its field of op~rat10n, where 
a substantial part of its ordinary traffte was. to be 
carried on. Therefore, although a single act? t~ con-
stituted a doing of business in the state wtthm the 
meaning of the Statute." 
There are numerous cases which reach the same conclu-
~ions of those set forth hereinabove but we think the foregoing 
is a fair example of what the law is, and to cite others would 
be merely accumulative. 
It may be concluded or assumed that the court in deciding 
this case in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, 
the court labored under the presumption tha this was an isolated 
transaction inasmuch as defendants could not at the time pro-
duce more than two instances of such contract solicited in 
Utah, at that time, due to lack of obtaining other evidence and 
that such was a mere solicitation which some courts have 
decided is in interstate commerce, but the court utterly failed 
to take into consideration the obligations on the part of the 
plaintiff's assignor to perform acts of purely a local nature and 
performing acts and duties which take this case out of the realm 
of purely solicitation. Even though this may be considered 
as an isolated transaction of one or two contracts, it surely 
comes within the meaning of the law as outlined in the cases 
hereinabove set forth. We must assume that the court in 
deciding this case on pre-trial took this attitude in view of 
the fact that the court failed to make a pre-trial order herein 
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POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION 
OF THE DEFENDANTS FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED 
UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WHICH 
COULD NOT REASONABLY BE PRODUCED BY THE 
DEFENDANTS AT THE TIME OF THE PRE-TRIAL OF 
SAID MATTER. 
Within the time prescribed by the rules of Civil Pro-
cedure the plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial based upon 
the grounds: "Newly discovered evidence, material for the 
party making the application, which they could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the 
trail." This motion and its amendments were supported by 
,iJfidavits of the plaintiff disclosing why such evidence could 
not be produced at the pre-trial or at the trial of the case 
had a trial been permitted. (Tr. 44-45-46-47-48-49). 
The discovery of this evidence, as shown by the affidavits 
of one of the defendants shows that the additional evidence, 
which defendant desired to produce was discovered purely by 
accidental means and that he diligently pursued the lead that 
he obtained, and by diligently pursuing this lead he discovered 
that the plaintiff's assignor, the Carbozite Protective Coatings 
Inc., had been procuring these contracts from numerous parties 
within the state of Utah and other states over several years 
r by its agents, and its pursuit of business and activities were 
practically the same in each case. Had the defendants been 
granted a new trial, this evidence could have been readily 
produced to show that the case now before the court was not 
c:n isolated transaction but a continuity of business in the state 
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on the part of this corporation. Defendants could have pro-
duced evidence to show that the Carbozite Protective Coatings 
Inc., had stored some of its merchandise in a warehouse in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and was carrying on an active business 
within the state. To deny the defendants' motion for a new 
trial was depriving the defendants of their day in court and 
It was error on the part of the court to reach such a decision 
based merely upon a conclusion. 
At a continuation of the hearing of the pre-trial date, the 
defendant appeared in court to testify of his diligence in pro-
curing the evidence that he wished to produce at the trial, 
in support of his affidavit and how he accidentally discovered 
the additional evidence, which he could not have done with 
ciue diligence before this pre-trial, or the trial of the case had 
(I trial been had, but apparently the court concluded from the 
discussion had at the pre-trial that such evidence would not 
be material, when in fact it would show a continued business 
activity on the part of the plaintiff's assignor within the State 
of Utah. See discussoin at the pre-trial (Tr. 33-34-34¥2·35-
36-3 7) . I am assuming the court concluded this which should 
probably have been shown by a pre-trial order and filing of 
findings of act and conclusions of law, which are lacking in 
the case. Defendant was not permitted to testify in support of 
his affidavit for a new trial. This, in our opinion, was an abuse 
of discretion of the court. 
Jensen vs. Logan City, 57 Pac. 2d 708 at 723 (Utah). 
'·w~ere disinterested test~mony on the vital point in 
a case 1s very scant, newly dtscovered testimony on that 
point appearing from affidavits in support of the mo-
20 
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tion for a new trial to be apparently reliable, when it 
appears that the movant for the new trial was not 
guilty of indiligence in failing to obtain the witness 
for the trial, and that there is no element of holding 
such witness in reserve for purposes of obtaining a 
new trial - generally picturesquely denominated in 
slang phraseology as "an ace in the hole"-and it 
appears likely that such evidence would change the 
result, a new trial should be granted. While the grant-
ing or refusing of the motion lies in the sound dis-
cretion of the court, where there is grave suspicion 
that justice may have miscarried because of the lack 
of enlightenment on a vital point which new evidence 
will apparently supply, and the other elements attend-
ant on obtaining a new trial on the grounds of newly 
discovered evidence are present, it would be an abuse 
of sound discretion not to grant the same." 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully submits: 
(a) That plaintiff's assignor, the Carbozite Protective 
Coatings, Inc., was and is presently doing business in the 
State of Utah as a foreign corporation not authorized to do 
business within this state. It was stipulated by counsel for 
respondent that said Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., was 
a foreign corporation not qualifying to do business in Utah. 
(Tr. 24). 
(b) The contract itself, Exhibit "A" (Tr. 52), requues 
the said corporation to perform acts of purely local nature, 
t~dvertising, furnishing advertising material for its jobbers; 
agreeing to send representatives into the state to assist in the 
sale af its merchandise. 
21 
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(c) Taking notes of its jobbers, (trade aceptances) whid 
are payable and collectable in local banks. 
(d) Entering into contracts within the stateof Utah by 
its duly authorized agents, then violating the provisions of 
said contracts, then assigning its contracts to third parties, who 
apparently are holders in due course, for the purpose of suit 
and evasions of its obligations, or preventing defendants from 
asserting their defense thereto, without having to go to the 
expense of suing thereon in the home state of said corporation. 
(e) If each case is to be decided upon its own facts, as 
decided by our Supreme Court and other states, I respectfully 
~ubmit that the facts of the case now before the court dearly 
falls within the preview of the cases in their brief submitted, 
and the court should find that the said Carbozite Protective 
Coatings Inc., the plaintiff's assignor, is doing business within 
the State of Utah, and their contracts should be held void by 
reason of the statute of the State of Utah made and provided 
in such cases. 
(f) That the court abused its discretion in denying the 
Jefendants' motion for a new trial to produce newly discovered 
evidence which could not be produced at the time of the pre· 
trial with diligence on the part of the defendants, to show a 
continued business on the part of the plaintiff's assignor within 
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